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Abstract: 
 
 
Can the political science literature on sons-of-the-soil (SoS) conflict and civil war explain patterns of ethnic 
conflict over land in sub-Saharan Africa?  Sons-of-the-soil terminology, developed with reference to 
conflicts in South Asia, has been used to describe some of Africa's most violent or enduring conflicts, 
including those in in eastern DRC, northern Uganda, the Casamance Region of Senegal, and southwestern 
Côte d'Ivoire. Is Africa becoming more like South Asia, where land scarcity has often fueled conflicts 
between indigenous land owners and in-migrants?  This paper argues that political science theories that 
focus on rural migration and land scarcity alone to explain outbreaks of SoS conflict in Asia fall short in 
Africa because they are underdetermining.  The paper proposes a model of structure and variation in land 
tenure institutions in sub-Saharan Africa, and argues that these factors are critical in explaining the 
presence of absence of SoS conflict over land.  This conceptualization of the problem highlights the strong 
role of the state in structuring relations of land use and access, and suggests that the character of local state-
backed land institutions goes far in accounting for the presence or absence, scale, location, and triggering of 
large-scale SoS land conflict in zones of smallholder agriculture.  A meta-study of 24 subnational cases of 
land conflict (1990-2014), drawn from secondary and primary sources and field observations, generates 
case-based support for the argument. The study suggest that omission of land-tenure institution variables 
enfeebles earlier political science theory, and may inadvertently lead policy makers and practitioners to the 
erroneous conclusion that in rural Africa, primordial groups compete for land in an anarchic state of nature. 
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Introduction 
 
 
 Can the political science literature on sons-of-the-soil (SoS) conflict and civil war explain patterns 
of ethnic conflict over land in sub-Saharan Africa?  Scholars of Africa increasingly draw analogies between 
African land conflicts and the conflicts in South Asia that inspired SoS theories. Bates (2008) drew this 
analogy when he identified clashes between indigenous landholders and in-migrants over land as a factor in 
the collapse of political order in several African states.  Many others have used sons-of-the-soil 
terminology to describe some of Africa's most violent or enduring conflicts, including those in in eastern 
DRC, northern Uganda, the Casamance Region of Senegal, and southwestern Côte d'Ivoire.
1
  Some 
structural and processual aspects of land-related conflict in Africa do indeed mirror South Asian-style sons-
 2 
of-the-soil conflicts.  In many parts of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) today, rural population densities and 
levels of land inequality are approaching those prevailing in rural South Asia in the 1950s and 1960s. Land 
hunger, shrinking farm sizes, and patterns of agricultural involution reminiscent of parts of Asia can now 
be found in the densely settled regions of most African countries.
2
  These socio-demographic realities 
shatter old assumptions or stereotypes about Africa's land abundance and the "social safety valve" that open 
land frontiers could provide.  Moreover, as in South Asia, rising land competition in Africa often heightens 
tension between sons-of-the-soil and in-migrants who have settled in their homelands, sometimes fueling 
localized ethnic violence or contributing to larger political conflagrations.  This intertwining of land 
competition and ethnic conflict is what suggests analogies to the South Asian struggles that inspired 
political science theorizing on SoS conflict.   
 This paper asks how far political science theory on the outbreak and escalation of SoS conflict in 
South Asia can go in explaining patterns of SoS conflict in SSA. It focuses one of the most-cited political 
science theories of SoS conflict, Fearon and Laitin's (2011) SoS conflict escalation model, which was 
illustrated with an account of land conflict in Sri Lanka.  Fearon and Laitin's theory links land competition 
to civil war through an ethnic conflict trigger mechanism.  Their findings present Africa scholars with a 
puzzle. Classic sons-of-soil civil war appears to be surprisingly rare in Africa, sub-Saharan Africa's high 
levels of ethnic heterogeneity and the high prevalence of civil war.
3
  In SSA's densely settled, ethnically-
heterogeneous zones, even SoS conflict on scales of magnitude and intensity that fall well below F&L's 
operational definition of civil war (1,000+ battle deaths) is rare.
 4
  When ethnic tensions over land do 
mount, they rarely escalate, contra the predictions of F&L's model. Instead, conflicts tend to be contained 
at the local level, rarely reaching a scale that would garner attention in the international press, much less the 
scale required for inclusion in civil war data sets. We are confronted with a thorny analytic problem: What 
explains the rarity of SoS conflict in Africa, even in densely-settled, ethnically heterogeneous zones, and 
the localized scale of most land conflict? And can the same explanation help account for the location and 
timing of the occasional, ferocious outbreaks that do scale-up to civil war proportions?  
 This paper argues that the theoretical solution lies in a variable that is omitted in F&L's SoS 
conflict model: land tenure institutions.  In smallholder farming regions of SSA, national rulers have 
created and enforced land tenure institutions that structure local ethnic hierarchies around land.  The 
 3 
analysis suggests that variations across time and space in how land tenure institutions enforce ethnic 
hierarchy offer great leverage in explaining patterns of SoS conflict over land in African countries.
5
  
 The conceptual work begins with Part I, which reviews classic SoS theories from South Asia and 
their offspring, including the work invoked above, framing insights and puzzles they pose for Africa 
scholars.  Part II reviews existing work on land scarcity and migration-induced ethnic heterogeneity in 
SSA. Although systematic statistical evidence is lacking, fragmentary country data and the secondary 
literature show clearly that although the F&L's hypothesized structural preconditions for SoS conflict over 
land are widely present, SoS land conflict is not.  Part III defines land tenure systems in SSA as 
"institutions" which vary subnationally, offers a conceptualization of how they vary, and conceptualizes 
mechanisms that produce stability and instability in SoS-migrant relations across institutional types.  
Moving to the task of theory-generating, Part IV derives hypotheses about how institutional differences 
may predict the presence (absence), scale, location, and triggering of large-scale SoS land conflict. Part V 
presents a structured comparison of 24 subnational cases (1990-2014), based upon secondary and primary 
sources and field observations, to argue that differences in land tenure institutions are associated with 
different types of land conflict.
6
 The case studies bloster the plausibility of the paper's arguments about the 
salience of institutional variation in explaining conflict patterns, although more rigorous tests await the 
creation of extensive new bodies of data and causally-motivated research designs.  To further probe the 
plausibility of the institutional argument proposed in this study, the final section, Part VI, leverages the 
historical, conceptual, and case-based material presented in earlier sections to take on an important rival 
argument: the demographic determinism hypothesis. The conclusion is a discussion that underscores flaws 
in political science's earlier, "institutionless" theories of SoS conflict over land. 
 
Part I.  The Classic SoS literature  
 
 
 Myron Weiner's (1978) classic work on SoS conflict in India identified ethnic in-migration 
(migration across India's internal ethnic borders) and livelihood competition as a combustible combination. 
Weiner focused  on states undergoing rapid economic modernization, where growth "pulls in" migrants 
from less dynamic regions.  His concern was with the response of autochthonous "sons-of-the-soil" groups 
to the arrival of in-migrants.  Weiner suggested that where livelihood options are abundant and cooperative 
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economic relations between autochthones and migrants prevail, political and social relations between the 
two groups are likely to be peaceful.  Conversely, in settings with few employment and livelihood options, 
and with limited prospects for rewarding outmigration by the SoS, competition between SoS and in-
migrants  increases likelihood of political conflict. Weiner's students and others have developed this 
perspective in an impressive case study literature (Katzenstein 1979, Varshney 2003, Jha 2014, Bhavnani 
and Lacina 2015). 
 Fearon and Laitin's (F&L) (2011) influential study of civil war suggested and sustained in-
migration to farming regions and rising land scarcity could ignite SoS conflict in the ways that Weiner 
anticipated.  In their model of developing countries, internal migration produces ethnic heterogeneity and 
rising population densities on the agrarian frontier, where the presence of the state is weak. As population 
density rises, SoS eventually become frustrated that migrants have occupied so much of their land. The co-
presence of these factors -- economic competition and ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration -- creates 
the structural conditions in which the random spark of an interpersonal dispute between SoS and migrants 
(a theft, rape, or insult), perhaps aided by the provocation of a local political entrepreneur, may escalate 
into spontaneous ethnic clashes.  Figure 1 illustrates this model to underscore its analytic parsimony.  
   Figure 1: Likelihood of SoS conflict  (about here) 
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 For F&L, the structural conditions identified above are a combustible combination.  Whether the 
spark of localized violence escalates into civil war depends on how the state enters the scene to restore 
order.  In response to clashes, the police then the army (if need be) will intervene to restore order.  If the 
state supports the SoS, the defenseless migrants are likely to return to their home areas because if they do 
not, they may face uncontrolled reprisals from indigenes. Peace is likely to be reestablished.  If the state 
favors the migrants, however, there may be trouble.  The SoS may challenge the government, and the army 
may be brought in to repress them.  Where the SoS fight back, we have the opening salvos in an ethnic 
rebellion against the state.  Sri Lanka serves as a case in point to establish the plausibility of the model. 
 F&L do not offer a theory of why government partisanship may vary, or of temporal dynamics, 
suggesting only that in developing countries, raison d'état often militates in favor of supporting migration-
fueled economic development. A more recent contribution "brings the state in," refining the model's 
predictions about state partisanship (Bhavnani and Lacina (2015).
 7
 
 How far does the model of economic competition and demographic structure go in describing and 
predicting patterns of SoS land conflict in contemporary Africa?  Let us turn to the structural arguments 
first.  
 
Part II. Pressure on the land ethnic in-migration in sub-Saharan African countries 
 Classic SoS theories identify two structural drivers of ethnic conflict over land:  land competition 
among farmers, and ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration.  Fifty years ago, most scholars took these 
factors as virtually absent in rural Africa.  They would have not been surprised by the relative rarity of SoS 
conflict over land.  Yet demographers, economists, and land tenure scholars tell us that the old image of 
Africa as a continent of ethnically homogenous village communities surrounded by vast expanses of open 
land is largely obsolete. Decades of research work have shown rural-to-rural migration to be a phenomenon 
of major importance in many parts of contemporary Africa, starting in the mid-twentieth century (if not 
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before).  In fact, the structural conditions thought to set the stage for SoS conflict are present in many rural 
settings.  
  
Economic competition over land 
 Sub-saharan Africa's rural populations have almost quadrupled since 1930, rising from 112 million 
to about 460 million in 2010 (Jayne et al., 2014).  Even with the spectacular growth of megacities like 
Lagos and Nairobi, 32 of SSA's 42 non-island countries are still predominantly rural. On average, 62% of 
national populations lived in rural areas in 2015, and most of these people depend at least in part upon land 
access for livelihoods and subsistence.
8
  As rural populations have increased and rates of technical 
innovation in agriculture have remained slow, population pressure on the land has mounted.  In Kenya, for 
example, the rural population increased from 13.6 to 20 million over the course of 1980-2004,
9
 and is 
projected to reach about 30 million over the next three decades. Tanzania's rural population increased three-
fold between 1967 and 2012 and is still growing.
10
  Côte d'Ivoire's rural population is projected to expand 
from 11 to 15 million between 2016 and 2050.   Xinshen Diao et al. (2007: 35) of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute described the reality of land pressure in these terms:   
In the 1970s "virgin land were available in most countries and the pressure to change established 
ways of production (and accompanying social institutions) was low.  The situation has changed 
dramatically over the past three decades.  Africa's population has quadrupled since the 1950s and 
is projected to more than double between 2000 and 2050.  Expansion of arable land has stagnated 
in recent years, indicating that land frontiers may have been reached. The result of mounting 
population pressure and declining farm sizes."  
 
 
Africa's rural populations are still growing. The subcontinent's rural population is projected to grow by 48% 
between 2010 and 2050.
11
   
 Some implications for economic competition over land are clear:  "One of the most important 
trends in African agriculture is a steady decline in land-to-person ratios.  ... In Kenya, Ethiopia, and 
Zambia, for example, this ratio is about half as large as it was in the 1960s."
12
 Average farm sizes have 
shrunk due to fragmentation of holdings.  In Kenya, Zambia, and Ethiopia today, 25% of rural households 
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are landless or near-landless (Jayne et al. 2010: 1386).  Rising inequality in landholdings is also pervasive 
in Eastern and southern Africa. Signs of agricultural involution (falling productivity of labor), shortening 
fallows, fragmentation of landholdings are observed in many smallholder farming zones in both East and 
West Africa (Jayne et al, 2010 and 2014).  Another sign of pressure on the land is creation of farms in less 
and less hospitable terrain, including encroachment on rangelands and grasslands used by pastoralists.   
 In a 2006 report, Goran Djurfeldt, writing for the Swedish International Development Agency 
(2006: 11), wrote that population pressure and food insecurity were generating "pressure from below" on 
governments. "In many ways the present situation in sub-Saharan Africa resembles that of Asia when 
Green Revolutions were launched there [in the 1960s and 1970s]." 
 
Ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration 
 High pressure on the land combines with high degrees of ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration 
in many parts of rural Africa.  Just what is meant by "ethnic heterogeneity" in this context requires some 
discussion.  Colonial administrative structure and practice in twentieth-century Africa aimed at creating 
monoethnic rural districts ("tribal homelands" under colonial indirect rule), often overwriting preexisting 
cultural diversity with new, officially-imposed ethnic labels.  What modern African states and 
demographers recognize as "interethnic migration," rural-to-rural migration, and district-level ethnic 
heterogeneity is migration across these official ethnic borders.  Colonial and postcolonial law and 
administrative practice have discouraged spontaneous and permanent group migration across these 
subnational boundaries. A person outside of his or her designated ethnic homeland is considered to be a 
"migrant," stranger, ethnic outsider, or in Nigeria's official jargon, an "internal foreigner." In most of 
Africa, until today, there is no official recognition or enforcement of permanent land rights transfers among 
members of different ethnic groups. "Deportation" of persons and groups across ethnic boundaries ("back 
to their home areas") in not uncommon. This hardening of state-recognized ethnic identities stands in stark 
contrast to the fluidity that usually prevailed in pre-colonial eras, when mobility and assimilation over the 
longue durée produced patterns of cultural mixing and sedimentation that have been tracked by linguists, 
historians and archeologists (Lentz 2014, Berry 1993).  
 8 
 Restrictions on large-scale spontaneous movements and impediments to the development land 
markets, however, did not preclude state-sponsored migration flows across official ethnic boundaries in 
order to supply labor -- as "temporary" migrant labor or, more exceptionally, as settlers -- to fuel the 
expansion of commercial agricultural production in some parts of colonial and post-colonial Africa.  Such 
"inter-ethnic" or rural-to-rural migration has been a force of major importance in the economic, social, and 
demographic history of sub-Saharan Africa. West Africa's integration into the world economy in the 20th 
century as an exporter of primary products, especially agricultural products -- coffee, tea, cocoa, cotton, 
groundnuts, palm oil -- was made possible by large shifts of population from densely populated zones of 
the western Sahel to the wetter, forested coastal zones.  East, central, and southern Africa have also seen 
major, state-orchestrated population movements. The most notorious of these involved expulsion of 
African populations from territory expropriated by the colonial state, and the resettlement of Africans in 
"tribal reserves" as peasant or subsistence farmers, or on European-held estates as worker-tenants or 
worker-squatters. In postcolonial Africa, major state-assisted population movements have fueled export-
crop production across the parts of Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Burkina Faso, and Mali.  Settlement 
schemes in Rwanda, eastern DRC, Tanzania, and Kenya drove official rural development schemes and 
reconfigured local social relations around land and rural production.  
 Interethnic migration is well documented in country-level studies and at the micro-level, but it is 
hard to study at the macro or aggregate level.  After the late 1960s, most of what we know about rural-to-
rural migration comes from disparate small-scale studies "which have not been synthesized"  (Gould 
1995:129).  In the academic literature on migration, rural-to-rural migration has been almost completely 
overshadowed by studies of rural-to-urban migration. Even so, "the few available studies show rural-to-
rural flows to be substantial and greater than rural-to-urban flows in some cases... [It is driven largely] by 
the search for more land, better land, and jobs... with outflows from more densely populated areas and 
inflows to relatively sparsely populated areas."....  (ibid). "There is a consensus that most moves of this 
kind are based on the attraction of fertile land for farming" (Aina 1995: 49).  
 For Ghana, Senegal, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya -- all countries with high levels of internal migration in 
the 1960s and 1970s -- rural-to-rural flows across internal "ethnic boundaries" accounted for about 50% of 
all internal migration, and most of this was migration connected with the expansion of agriculture.
13
  For 
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Ghana in the 1990s, migration to the urban areas was "reported to be of minor importance compared to 
other internal migration flows," including rural-to-rural migration across Ghana's ethno-regional 
boundaries.
14
  Rift Valley Province, the locus of in-migration and agricultural settlement in Kenya in the 
1960s and 1970s, was described by Ominde (1968: 122) as an "ethnic melting pot" that was more ethnically 
diverse than Nairobi itself.  
 Zachariah and Condé (1981:58) compared two West African countries with very high rates of 
internal mobility in 1970.  They calculated that 17% of Ghana's native born population had migrated among 
Ghana's seven regions in 1970.  The comparable figure for Côte d'Ivoire was 15%.  For Uganda, Kagera's 
work with the 1969 census data showed that over 10% of all nationals resided outside of their region of 
birth.  Of these, about 80% were in the rural areas rather than in the two principal cities of Kampala and 
Jinja.
15
  These 1970 figures for Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Uganda are about three times higher than the 
average rate of "interethnic" migration  in India which Mary Katzenstein calculated at "over 5%" (1979: 
38).    
 For decades, ethnic in-migrants have constituted the majority of the population in some rural 
districts southern Côte d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Tanzania, Uganda, and the Eastern DRC.  In many places, ethnic 
strangers constitute very considerable minorities. In Burkina Faso's cotton-producing Haut Bassins region, 
for example, "strangers" ("lifetime inter-departmental migrants") comprised about 11.6% of the farming 
population in 1975.
16
  In Senegal's Sine-Saloum region in 1960, the percentage of "lifetime in-migrants" 
was 14.8.
17
 In Bunyoro in western Uganda in 1969, 26% of the population was made-up of immigrants 
from other districts of Uganda.
18
  In Gambia's groundnut producing rural areas, "it is commonplace to find 
several ethnic groups in a village."
19
 
 Although we lack the statistical data necessary to produce a systematic, cross-national and over-
time portrait of the landscape of rural ethnic in-migration, there is ample evidence of the kind of ethnic 
heterogeneity due to in-migration in farming regions that could, hypothetically, give rise to SoS tension and 
conflict.
20
  
 
Migration, ethnic heterogeneity, and land conflict in African countries  
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 De Bruijn et al. (2001: 21-22) remarked that "given the enormous diversity of cultural forms in 
Africa and the important role of [spatial] mobility in social life, it is surprising that the cohabitation of all 
these people with all its variety has been so peaceful for so much of the time." This is exactly the point that 
is underscored here:  There is far less overt SoS conflict over land than the combination of ethnic 
heterogeneity due to in-migration and economic competition over land (demographic pressure on the land) 
would predict, if such predictions were based on simple extrapolation from the F&L (2011) model.    
 That said, migration-driven ethnic heterogeneity and rising land scarcity are sometimes jointly 
present in situations of violent conflict over land.  Africa scholars have documented large-scale communal 
conflict over land in precisely such settings, and many of the most explosive cases, the ones that have 
escalated into large-scale conflagrations, have been described as sons-of-the-soil conflict.  Ethnicity 
defined the line of social cleavage in land-rated conflicts in Kenya and Côte d'Ivoire in the 1990s, as it was 
in DRC in 1990-1993 and Rwanda in the early 1990s, to name the most terrible and destructive cases of the 
decade.
21
  These are zones with long histories of some of the highest state-sponsored rural-to-rural 
"economic migration" in-flows in all of colonial and postcolonial Africa (with migration in-flows dating to 
the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s in these cases).  
 Smaller-scale land-related ethnic conflict also appears to be increasing in frequency and intensity 
in places where in-migration has contributed to rising pressure on the land. These fly far under the radar of 
scholars who compile civil war data sets  that set 1,000 battle deaths as the inclusion threshold, and events 
data sets that track violent communal conflicts on a lesser scale. The smaller-scale conflicts analyzed in 
extensive case-study literatures are almost always contained at the local level, and play out with little overt 
violence. They result in land-takings, broken contracts, and expulsions.   
 Event data generated by the the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) project does pick up the 
ethnicity-land connection, however. A 2013 study by von Uexkull and Pettersson identified land as "one of 
the core conflict issues" in 75% of the episodes of fighting between non-state groups identified along 
communal lines (deaths > 25) in Africa between 1989 and 2011.
22
  Yet their coding scheme recorded only a 
handful of farmer-on-farmer conflicts.  Straus and Taylor (2012: 194-5) cited Social Conflict in Africa 
Database data (SCAD data, based on AP and AFP press reports from 1990-2011) as evidence of high and 
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rising numbers of local conflict episodes over livelihood resources since the 1990s, including ethnic 
conflict over land and water.  
 Straus (2012) stressed that the politics of these processes are very poorly understood, and he is 
correct. The co-presence of land scarcity and ethnic heterogeneity does not reliably predict conflict: ethnic 
peace prevails in most of densely populated, ethnically-heterogeneous zones that demographers and 
migration scholars have studied for decades.  Violence is rare, and usually highly localized if it happens at 
all.  When it does scale-up, however, it is very costly.  To restate the questions posed at the outset of this 
study, what explains the infrequency and "containerization" at the local level of SoS conflict in ethnically 
heterogeneous zones of rural Africa? Can the same variables and mechanisms help account for the 
episodic, bloody explosions of SoS conflict over land that have wracked some African countries?  
 
Part III. Conceptualizing institutional determinants of SoS conflict over land 
 
 In F&L's influential model, SoS and in-migrants compete over land "on the frontier," in settings 
where the state is weak or absent.  In zones of smallholder farming in Africa, however, land tenure relations 
do not play out in the anarchic state of nature that is the implicit backdrop to the F&L model.
23
  Instead, 
land competition between autochthones and migrants is structured by public-order institutions -- land law 
and territorial administration -- and state coercion.
24
 This means that in-migration to farming zones, and the 
land competition between SoS and migrants that may result, takes place on structured playing fields, where 
hierarchical power relations are structured by institutions that are enforced by the state.  Land tenure 
institutions vary across space, and these variations are key in explaining the presence or absence, scale, 
spatial distribution (location), and triggering of large-scale SoS conflict. 
 In SSA, public-order land tenure institutions vary across subregions within countries.  The district 
level (second subnational level jurisdiction) is, as a rough cut, the territorial scale that is appropriate and 
useful for identifying these variations. Abstracting from local complexity, it is possible to describe land 
institutions (land tenure regimes) as varying along one key dimension:  the extent of prerogative they 
confer to indigenes in controlling local in-migration and land allocation.
25
  Africa's neocustomary land 
regimes, estimated to govern about 90% of all land in sub-Saharan Africa (averaging across countries, see 
Deininger 2003:2), confer prerogative to local communities of ethnic insiders, empowering indigenes (via 
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the agency of state-backed communal leaders whose claims to authority are rooted partially in ethnic 
kinship and ancestral custom) to regulate in-migration and allocation land.
26
  Under "statist" land regimes, 
by contrast, prerogatives to regulate in-migration and allocate land are exercised directly by state agents 
who act as pure and direct agents of the central state (such as prefects, settlement officers, or district 
officials).  Statist land institutions deprive indigenes of the power to regulate in-migration and land 
allocation. In the absence of devolution of power to local state-backed neocustomary leaders, the 
reproduction of statist land regimes requires the on-going and overt exercise of state powers, including 
coercive power.    
 Institutional variation is observable across subnational jurisdictions.  In Kenya today, for 
example, about 65% of all land, including most rangeland and agro-pastoral lands, are held under 
neocustomary-type institutions.
27
  Farmland concentrated in central Kenya, the central Rift Valley, and the 
Coast is under statist-type land institutions, including private property, state-owned land, adjudicated land, 
and land on settlement schemes that is allocated by direct state agents to households.
28
 
 The neocustomary-statist distinction is picked up, albeit imperfectly, in Round 4 Afrobarometer 
survey data, conduced in 2010.  Question 58 on this survey asked, "Who do you think has primary 
responsibility for managing land allocation, central government, local government, traditional leaders, or 
members of the community?"
29
   "Traditional leaders" is the reply one would give under a neocustomary 
land tenure regime.  The results below, extracted from Afrobarometer, are reported in a a way that 
highlights wide variation both cross-nationally and across subnational regions of the 15 countries that were 
included in this part of Round 4.  Table 1 gives national averages alongside the highest and lowest 
subnational regional score on this question.  As expected, very wide subnational variation is observed in all 
countries except Tanzania (low country-wide, as expected), and Malawi (high country-wide, as expected 
for this labor-reserve type economy). Even though Afrobarometer data are not ideal for present purposes, 
the results provide an evidentiary base for the argument that African land tenure regimes (LTRs) vary at the 
subnational level, and along the dimension identified here.
30
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Table 1 here 
 
 
   Table 1: "Who allocates the land? Traditional leaders" 
 
 
     Table 1 
 "Who allocates the land?  Traditional leaders" (responses by country and subnational region) 
    Afrobarometer Round 4 (2010) 
 
  National average  Subnational region Subnational region  
     high score  low score 
 
Benin  16.58   29.17   2.50 
Botswana 23.92   43.75   5.00 
DRC  no data   --   -- 
Ghana  68.67   89.29   41.07 
Kenya   18.02   38.81   8.71 
Malawi  60.67   66.45   57.17 
Mozambique* no data   --   -- 
Namibia  22.67   52.08   5.00 
Nigeria  20.61   60.71   0 
Senegal** 16.00   28.13   8.93 
South Africa 15.33   33.65   1.25 
Tanzania 1.40   2.25   0 
Uganda  28.96   40.00   15.06 
Zambia   39.25   75.66   7.39 
Zimbabwe 43.42   64.06   16.50 
 
Source: Afrobarometer Round 4 (2010) 
* "Trad. leaders" was accidently left off as an option on the Moz. survey. See Logan 2011. 
** In Senegal, "traditional leaders" are incorporated into local government (rural councils), so yielding 
percentages lower than what a substantive analysis would reveal. See Boone 1993, 2003, and Koter 2013.  
Thanks to Kai Ping Huang for the Afrobarometer data 
 
 
 
 
Neocustomary institutions.    
 As Laitin (1986) observed, colonial states established ethnic hierarchies embedded in land control.  
Colonial indirect rule institutionalized the local-level political and economic dominance of state-recognized 
ethnic groups (officially certified "indigenous tribes ") within state-delimited ethnic homeland territories.  
These homeland territories were colonial district-level (or canton) jurisdictions, and these internal political 
subdivisions persist as districts or sub-districts in most African countries today.  The institutional form of 
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land tenure under indirect rule was what colonial regimes called "customary land tenure," and most 
postcolonial Africa states have adopted this term and its substantive meaning. The term "neocustomary 
land tenure" points to the twentieth-century, state-backed, origins and institutionalization of this form of 
land tenure in Africa.  
 In most smallholder farming zones of sub-Saharan Africa today, governments institutionalize and 
enforce neocustomary land tenure institutions which back "SoS" dominance over land within ethnic 
homeland territories.
31
  Most land in sub-Saharan Africa is now held under some form of neocustomary 
land tenure. Deininger (2003:2) proposes the figure 90% as a rough estimate.  Under neocustomary land 
tenure in farming zones, chiefs or other (neo)traditional local authorities who are recognized by the state -- 
and often nominated and paid by central governments -- are authorized to handle land administration within 
state-recognized chiefly jurisdictions.  The prevalence of neocustomary land tenure institutions means that 
in most of rural Africa, state-recognized and state-backed "SoS" dominate in land tenure relations.  
 Under neocustomary land tenure regimes, ethnic migrants gain access to land with the permission 
of SoS.  Under these rules, ethnic in-migrants occupy economic roles that are highly complementary, and 
subordinate, to those of the SoS.  In-migrants are workers, tenants, or sharecroppers on farms and 
plantations that belong to neocustomary landholders, and that lie within in the landholders' ethnic 
homeland. The ethnic insiders retain control of the land. As Samir Amin put it, the in-migrant "is inserted 
into a receiving society, already organized and structured" (1974: 66).   
 Figure 2 provides schematic diagrams of two types of settlement pattern that are typical under 
neocustomary land tenure rules. The diagrams are abstract (generalized) depictions of case-based 
information found in secondary and grey literature, primary texts and government documents (sometimes 
including maps and sketches), and the author's observations in seven field locations in four countries.
32
  
They are provided to illustrate and thus further elaborate the concept of settlement patterns typical of 
situations in which in-migrants join established communities that manage land under neocustomary land 
tenure rules.  In Locality A, in-migrants are attached to particular SoS households (as workers or tenants).  
In Locality B, in-migrants farm lands that lie on the periphery of the village territory.  In both situations, 
interethnic relations are structured by high-levels of interaction, information exchange, and SoS monitoring 
of individual and group behavior.  The institutional structure of the local community, and its embedding in 
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the national political system, work to enhance the SoS capacity for collective action vis-à-vis the in-
migrants, and to diminish in-migrants' capacity for local collective action.
33
  These arrangements are 
conducive to peaceful coexistence (Fearon and Laitin 1996). 
  
Figure 2: Ideal-typical (stylized) settlement patterns in zones of in-migration under neocustomary land 
tenure institutions  
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 Colonialism's neocustomary land tenure regimes prohibited the permanent transfer of land to 
ethnic outsiders (via permanent sales) to ensure that SoS retained land control in their designated 
homelands (Phillips 1989). Many postcolonial governments maintain prohibitions against the permanent 
sale of neocustomary land to ethnic outsiders, and almost all do so implicitly by not recording or enforcing 
land sales in zones of neocustomary tenure.  
 Within ethnic homelands, state-recognized ethnic entitlements confer social, political, and 
economic rights and prerogatives on ethnic insiders.  Outsider status, by contrast, is a second-class 
citizenship status (or internal foreigner status).  It tends to be carried from one generation to the next 
("Once a migrant, always a migrant," as a research assistant in Ghana said)(Boone and Duku 2012).  
Because their land access depends on permission and forbearance of customary landlords, "the perpetual 
threat that haunts the immigrants is -- expulsion" (Amin 1971: 66). 
 Amin's observation underscores a stark reality of neocustomary land institutions: under 
neocustomary institutions, levels and rates of in-migration are controlled by ethnic insiders. In effect, they 
"select" their preferred level of in-migration.    
 Why have neocustomary land tenure institutions persisted over time?  Interests supply a large part 
of the answer.  Neocustomary land tenure regimes generate large constituencies of beneficiaries (ethnic 
insiders, chiefs). They institutionalize a right -- ie. the right to land for members of state-recognized ethnic 
groups to claim land in state-recognized homelands.  Neocustomary political authorities, for their part, have 
a long-term interest in defending the land institutions that constitute the material base of neocustomary 
authority itself. Governments also have a stake in creating and reproducing neocustomary institutions.  
Rulers, fearing rebellion and eager to established political order, rarely support migrants, preferring instead 
to institutionalize and support autochthones' control over the land. Neocustomary land institutions help 
secure order in the countryside at low cost (in terms of revenue, administrative effort, and coercion) and 
have sustained some of Africa's most productive export- and food-crop producing peasantries. From the 
one-party era until today, incumbents have relied on the rural political/electoral constituencies organized 
around and within ethnic homelands as their prime bases of electoral support.  Neocustomary institutions 
have been the default choice when governments to not have compelling reasons (military, financial, 
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developmentalist, other) to impose land institutions that come with much higher political, administrative, 
and enforcement costs.   
 Although SoS have a shared interest in in maintaining the upper-hand, both politically and 
economically, over migrants, as aggregations of individuals they may suffer collective action problems in 
achieving these ends.
34
  Here, institutional dynamics have contributed the stability and self-enforcing nature 
neocustomary tenure: (a.) neocustomary tenure draws strength from private-order institutions in ethnic 
homelands: SoS's belief in their status as first-comers resonates with many pre-colonial ideologies that 
legitimate land occupation; and family and lineage ties exist among the SoS, producing micro-enforcement 
effects; (b.) neocustomary institutions weaken the migrant' capacity to win political concessions; and (c.) 
neocustomary land tenure is embedded in public-order institutions: state-backed political institutions 
uphold neocustomary land tenure itself, recognize titular ethnic communities and homeland jurisdictions, 
and enforce chieftaincy; and under neocustomary tenure, governments prohibit and do not enforce 
permanent interethnic land transfers.  There are indeed signs of erosion in these arrangements, but this 
process in highly uneven. In most places, it is recent.  
 
 
Statist land tenure institutions 
 In some subnational zones, rulers have chosen to not recognize any indigenous or ancestral rights 
to land, and to directly administer the allocation and reallocation of farmland.  In these zones, governments 
granted user-rights to in-migrants, and enforced these over the demands of citizens who claim to be SoS, 
firstcomers, or indigenous peoples. These arrangements are institutionalized in statist land tenure regimes.  
They exist where colonial and post-colonial governments have sponsored agrarian colonization movements 
to settle in-migrants on lands with high agricultural potential:  pastoralists have been displaced to "create 
new lands" for farming; governments have expropriated land for settlement of European farmers and 
ranchers; and governments have given land once allocated to white settlers to new generations of "black 
colonialists."  In in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, the Rwandan government settled peasants on land in 
Eastern Rwanda that had been "opened up" for farming by the expulsion of Rwandan Tutsis.
35
  
Governments have sponsored in-migration to zones cleared of tsetse flies or other carrying pests (Kiru 
Valley in Tanzania), and to zones opened up to farming by irrigation (Office du Niger, in Mali), the cutting 
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down of forests (southwestern Côte d'Ivoire), and swamp reclamation (eastern Rwanda).
36
  In all such 
cases, states sponsor the settlement of ethnic outsiders on lands to which the settlers have no state-
recognized ethnic entitlement or ancestral claim, often alongside or pushing aside a previously-settled 
group of land users (who may claim to be indigenous, SoS, or more rarely, previous holders of state-
recognized neocustomary rights).   
 Figure 3 offers schematic, ideal-typical depictions of settlement patterns under statist land tenure 
regimes.  Like Figure 2, the diagrams are abstract, general renderings of case-based information found in 
secondary and grey literature, primary texts and government documents (sometimes including maps and 
sketches), and the author's field observations.
37
  Figure 3 illustrates and elaborates the general concepts 
discussed in this section.  In Locality C and D, the state itself has demarcated and assigned parcels to in-
comers who have no family or historic connections to the land.  Hierarchical interdependencies and 
cooperative relation of production in agriculture are not embedded in these settlement patterns, in contrast 
to the norm under neocustomary tenure.  These microconditions may, by the Fearon and Laitin (1996) 
hypothesis, contribute to individual-level and SoS-migrant tensions. 
 
Figure 3: Stylized renderings of settlement patterns in zones of in-migration under statist land institutions 
 
 
Figure 3 here 
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 Why do rulers impose statist land tenure regimes in some subnational jurisdictions? Imposition of 
direct state control over land involves the extinguishing or non-recognition of ancestral or neocustomary 
rights.  Rulers must weigh potential gains against costs (in both political and economic terms). Gains are 
higher when the land is very productive and likely to produce a large marketable surplus, and where settler 
populations are tight allies of the incumbents. The costs of repression are lower where indigenous 
population densities are low and local populations are weak relative to the coercive power that the state is 
willing and able to muster.  In Africa, the calculus has rarely worked out in favor of imposition of statist 
land regimes, even under the direct colonial rule.  Colonial authorities did use the coercive powers of the 
state on behalf of white settlers (in South Africa, Kenya, and Rhodesia), especially in the early colonial 
period. Yet they usually recoiled from outright dispossessions where and when they believed that the 
resulting political backlash from Africans would be too costly to contain.
38
  Imposition of statist land tenure 
regimes did happen when pastoralists could be pushed aside (eg. Senegal's groundnut basin, parts of 
Tanzania, much of the Rift Valley) and where new zones were opened by irrigation (Mali), and in a few 
other places where colonizers felt their local might was sufficient to withstand local resentment (eastern 
Congo).  
 Are statist land tenure institutions stable?  For postcolonial governments, this form of land control 
is more costly and politically risky than the neocustomary option, relying as it does on direct 
administration, heavier state coercion, and oftentimes, repression of those asserting firstcomer or ancestral 
claims. A status quo of settlers implanted on contested terrain is thus likely to be a tenuous equilibrium, 
requiring costly exertion of state power to protect and defend the in-migrants, and more effort and cost to 
legitimate, especially since it violates the norm of neocustomary entitlement that is likely to prevail in other 
parts of the national territory.  
 Self-enforcement mechanism that are built-into statist land regimes are weaker than those at work 
in neocustomary institutions.  They lack the bottom-up self-enforcement mechanisms inherent in 
neocustomary land tenure institutions. In zones of state-sponsored in-migration -- such as settlement 
schemes in Kenya, Rwanda, E. DRC, and the Ivoirian forests opened to state-sponsored settlement -- 
postcolonial governments have refrained from giving settlers private property rights in land, arguably to  
reinforce the settlers' dependency on rulers (as political clientele).  This has weakened in-migrants' position 
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vis-à-vis all rival claimants to the land, including both SoS and other client groups who may be able to 
lobby the state for land access.    
 Commitment problems under statist land regimes are also serious. Incumbents' hold on state 
power is by definition insecure, and commitment problems between rulers and ruled are rife (Fearon 2004). 
Statist land tenure regimes can be destabilized when the composition of the state coalition changes, or when 
rulers' preferences change. Statist land regimes will collapse if the state fails.  Such shifts or dislocation at 
the top of the political system are likely to have a greater impact on statist land institutions than on 
neocustomary institutions, precisely because of the state's more direct role in land rights allocation and 
enforcement.  This makes statist land regimes are less stable and more brittle than neocustomary regimes.  
 Two different institutional configurations thus define rapports de force between SoS and migrants, 
producing political equilibria, or contracts between rulers and land-users, that are more or less prone to 
destabilization.  Neocustomary LTRs have strong self-reinforcing mechanisms and tend to be stable.  
Statist LTR are reliant on top-down coercion, and are thus less self-enforcing, more fragile, and more 
sensitive to change in the composition of the national governing coalition (ie., regime change, as in a coup 
d'état or electoral turnover). Figure 4 captures these distinctions. 
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 Figure 4:  Neocustomary and statist land institutions in smallholder farming zones, compared. 
 
 
 
Part IV: Conflict Typology: Hypotheses and Cases  
 
 Now that institutional variables and values have been specified, it is possible to advance 
hypotheses about how different types of institutions mediate tensions that arise from rising pressure on the 
land, thus shaping the political effects of rising land pressure.  Figure 5 uses concepts developed in Parts I, 
II, and III of this paper to sketch out a conceptual contrast space and generate hypotheses about the 
presence/absence of land-related SoS conflict in subnational jurisdictions without and without in-migration, 
and under different land tenure regimes. Predictions (hypotheses) relating to the presence or absence of SoS 
conflict, its scale, and sensitivity to regime change as a triggering mechanism are sketched out in the lower 
half of the figure.  Figure 5 thus offers a hypothetical typology of conflict forms.  Table 2 (below) identifies 
24 cases, using subnational rural jurisdictions as the unit of analysis, for which the history of the politics of 
land-competition is well-documented in specified time periods. In this study, I use the cases arrayed in 
Table 2 to argue that Figure 5's configuration of variables and associated hypothesized "conflict types" can 
be observed in the empirical world.  That the hypothesized configuration of variables and associated 
conflict types are observed across a range of cases that are dissimilar in other ways enhances the 
plausibility of the argument that Figure 5 has identified regularities that exist in the empirical world.  
 
 
Figure 5: Land Tenure Regimes in Smallholder Farming Zones: Predicted types of conflict (under land 
pressure) 
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Figure 5: Land Tenure Regimes in Smallholder Farming Zones: Predicted types of conflict (under land pressure) 
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Type 1 conflict.  Under neocustomary land tenure where there is no in-migration, there is an absence of 
inter-ethnic conflict over land (by definition).  
 Neocustomary land institutions play an on-going role in reproducing this situation -- these land 
tenure institutions make it very difficult to transfer land (via sale, for example) to non-members of the 
titular ethnic group.  Such sales may be illegal and governments will not enforce them.  Land scarcity can 
be expected to generate social tension among small scale farmers, but this will play out within the ethnic 
community. Land scarcity, national borders, and the presence of neocustomary institutions in other 
subnational jurisdictions (and thus of "internal borders" around other ethnic homelands) make it hard for 
land-hungry sons and daughters to acquire open land elsewhere.  Tensions are likely to generate inter-
generational conflict.    
 
Type 2.  Where there is ethnic in-migration under neocustomary land regimes, prevailing institutions 
empower the ethnic group recognized by the state as indigenous to that homeland (ie., the "SoS" group) to 
limit in-migration, to allocate land-access on a non-permanent basis to ethnic in-migrants, and to revoke 
these allocations.  Private and public order institutions work together to bolster SoS dominance. The result 
is landlord-stranger hierarchy in ethnically-mixed farming zones.  Ethnic strangers are the tenants, clients, 
dependents, guests, acceptees, or workers of indigenous hosts or "tutors."  In the face of rising competition 
over land, SoS may revoke in-migrants land-access rights and pressure them to leave the land.  Ethnic in-
migrants find themselves in a weak position. As anticipated in F&L's (2011) generic model of SoS conflict, 
migrants in Type 2 situations are likely to be dispersed, to lack territory of their own, and to be unarmed.  
Meanwhile, migrants are vulnerable to the exercise of everyday, micro-level neocustomary mechanisms of 
social surveillance, sanction, and control. Yet more decisively, under neocustomary land institutions in 
Africa, the government will not back their claims to land. Under pressure to make land concessions to the 
SoS, migrants have very likely to comply, even to the point of leaving the host area.  
 The theory predicts that these institutional set-ups will work to preempt large-scale SoS-versus-
migrant conflict over land. SoS-migrant tensions will be contained (or "containerized," as Mamdani 1996: 
51 puts it) at the local level.  The institutions are likely to be robust in the face of regime-change at the 
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national level, since they are the default choice of any incumbent and there are strong self-enforcing 
mechanisms at the local level. 
 This argument is consistent with, and support for it could thus reinforce, one of F & L's  (2011) 
central arguments: when and where the state backs SoS, the risk of overt SoS versus migrant conflict is 
low.  The weak spot in the F&L model is that it does not theorize the possibility that states may create 
institutions to produce precisely this outcome.
39
  In fact, in most agrarian zones in sub-Saharan Africa, such 
institutions prevail. 
 
Type 3. This branch of the tree describes situations in which the state promotes in-migration and backs 
migrants over those claiming ancestral or firstcomer land rights. Statist land allocations are made and 
enforced through muscular, on-the-ground presence of coercive agents of the state (such as settlement 
scheme officers, agents of the territorial administration, forest guards, and police). Politically, statist land 
institutions exist in tenuous equilibrium, balanced on the state's capacity and willingness to enforce, SoS's 
lack of capacity or unwillingness to resist, and migrants' ability and willingness to contribute to maintaining 
the status quo. As in F& L (2011), we assume migrants have no coercive power of their own.     
 Under conditions of high land competition, SoS may blame land shortages on the presence of in-
migrants.  Claim-making on the part of SoS is likely to be met with claim-defending on the part of in-
migrants. In these situations, the structural conditions for the rise of large-scale SoS conflict over land are 
present: land competition, and ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration. Given the prevailing institutions, 
we predict that this will find expression not in micro-conflicts that escalate into spontaneous pogroms, but 
rather in contestation over the statist land institutions that privilege the in-migrants.  Rulers who are willing 
to reproduce the prevailing institutions will repress the SoS.  
 Type 3 situations are thus propitious for the outbreak of large-scale conflict. Yet statist land 
institutions can and clearly have been reproduced over time, even in the face of mounting land pressure and 
mounting ethnic tensions over land ownership.  To go from institutional equilibria to break-down, we need 
a theory of institutional weakening (destabilization) and conflict-triggering mechanisms. 
 The theory here predicts that the statist LTR will hold as long as rulers maintain their commitment 
to statist land institutions and migrants. Yet statist land regimes are vulnerable to commitment failure 
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because they are often socially divisive and thus costly -- politically and economically -- to enforce. Shifts 
in the rulers' incentives, or a change in the state coalition itself (i.e., in who controls central government), 
may cause rulers' commitment to statist land institutions, and to the in-migrants, to weaken or disappear.   
 An outbreak of overt competition for control over the central government may raise the specter of 
such an outcome.  The introduction of elections may be destablizing:  rival elites emerge, and they may 
promise to dismantle statist land institutions if they win the elections.  Long-marginalized SoS may thus 
find allies at the center, and be emboldened to press their demands.  In the run-up to elections, ethnic 
cleansing in jurisdictions of statist land tenure may contribute to the SoS's short-term goal of partisan 
victory at the polls, and also to their long-term goal of retaking the land.  Migrants may mobilize 
defensively. Direct engagement of rival national-level politicians magnifies the potential for large-scale 
violence (Snyder 2000).  
 The theory predicts that large-scale outbreaks SoS-type land conflict is likely under these 
structural, institutional, and triggering (political-conjunctural) conditions. 
 
Type 4. In zones of smallholder agriculture, a statist land regime with no in-migration is almost impossible 
by definition.  In zones of smallholder agriculture, statist institutions have been imposed precisely to 
organize in-migration (by side-lining or expunging prior firstcomer or ancestral claims).  The Type 4 
situation does not have an empirical referent.  Preconditions for SoS conflict are absent in these settings. 
 
Case studies: illustration, synthesis, comparison and contrast 
 
 Elinor Ostrom pioneered the use of case study research on local institutions governing common-
pool resources as part of a larger program of research in this field (Ostrom 1990; Ostrom 2005; Poteete, 
Janssen, and Ostrom 2010).  Ostrom proposed theory and method for combining and collating qualitative 
evidence from multiple, conceptually-similar social-scientific case studies (field studies), following 
principles consistent with those of "structured focused comparison" in political science (George and 
Bennett 2004: 67-72).  These analytic strategies are designed to reveal hitherto undiscovered 
commonalities or patterns in case study results, making it possible to formulate hypotheses that generalize 
insights of individual case studies to larger sets of structurally-similar cases; they are ways of aggregating 
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information from configurational and case study analysis (Schlager 2016, Baggio 2016, George and 
Bennett 2004).  Structured comparison is used in Political Science to support hypothesis-generating and 
hypothesis-refining work (or to challenge theoretical claims advanced in earlier research, and thus used as a 
hypothesis-enfeebling strategy), often in combination with other types of data and analytic methods, given 
limits to the external validity of the findings due to non-random selection and thus possible non-
representativeness of cases examined, inter alia (Poteete et al. 2010: 90).   
 Structured focused comparison or comparative synthesis of case study research is well-suited to 
the quality and nature of the data we have on land politics under different tenure regimes in SSA.  Table 2 
summarizes information from 24 case studies (two observed in two time periods) of rising competition over 
land in regions of smallholder farming in SSA countries, with geographic units conceptualzed roughly as 
first or second subnational level administrative jurisdictions.  Information sources are listed in the last 
column of the table.
40
  Cases were selected to provide variation on dimensions of theoretical interest 
(Seawright and Gerring 2008: 296-7).  They provide empirical instantiation of the correlation between 
between the land-institution variables and conflict types 1, 2, and 3 that appear in Figure 5.  Table 2 
provides support for the arguments that (a.) land institution types as conceptualized above can be observed 
in the real world, and that variation is observed subnationally; (b.) that large-scale SoS conflict is absent in 
many well-studied rural districts characterized by both high ethnic heterogeneity due to in-migration and 
high pressure on the land (ie., there are many closely-observed settings in which F&L's theory of SoS land-
conflict mechanisms and triggers fails to produce the outcome predicted by their model); (c.) there are 
many cases wherein neocustomary land regimes prevail, and ethnic hierarchies have been reproduced over 
time even in the context of change in national-level state coalitions; (d.) there are several well-documented 
cases in which large-scale outbreaks of violent, SoS-type land conflict have happened under statist land 
regimes in times of threatened regime change.  
 The analysis here obviously cannot make a statistical assessment of the relative frequencies of 
predicted land-conflict outcomes under different land tenure institutions, and it relies on references to case 
studies, including some based on the author's primary research, which offer process-tracing (observational, 
circumstantial) evidence to link institutional cause and political effect.
41
  The cases constitute a non-random 
sample: they are ones for which we have rich, over-time data. They show that detailed case studies exist to 
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provide circumstantial evidence consistent with the paper's main hypotheses.
Table 2: Presence/Absence, Scale, and Timing of SoS-Type Land Conflict: Cases  
 
Type 
case/ 
place name country 
% in-migrants (1990s 
unless otherwise stated) case years 
SOS 
conflict?  conflict years 
conflict 
magnitude 
(deaths) 
conflict 
magnitude 
(displacement) 
change in 
state coalition 
(ever)? 
change in state 
coalition 
(conflict time)? sources 
1 Kisii Kenya <5% 1960s-2010s N NA     Y   Ontita, Orvis 
1 Meru Kenya <5% 1960s-2010s N NA     Y   MacKenzie 
1 Central Kenya <5% 1960s-2010s N NA     Y   Hagerud 
1 Luo Kenya <5% 1960s-2010s N NA     Y   Shipton 
1 S'rn Malawi Malawi <5% 1960s-2010s N NA     Y   Peters 
1 S'rn Ghana Ghana <5% 1990s N NA     Y   Amanor 
1 SE Nigeria Nigeria <5% 1980s N NA     Y   Chukwuezi 
2 SW Burkina Burkina ~40%** 1960s-2000s tension 1990s+ none reported 
many 
hundreds? Y Y Jacob 
2 Upper SRV Senegal ~20% (1980s) 1960-1990s tension 1990s+ a few hundreds Y N Platteau 
2 G-nut basin, central Senegal ~20% (1950s-) 1930-1970s tension 1960s none reported thousands Y Y David 
2 Baoule Region 
Côte 
d'Ivoire ~10% 1960-2000 tension 1990s none reported many hundreds Y Y Babo 
2 E. Côte d'Ivoire  
Côte 
d'Ivoire ~25% 1995-2000 tension 1950-1980s none reported none Y N Diaby 
2 W. Ghana Ghana ~35% 1950-2000 tension 1980s-1990s none reported none reported Y Y Boni 
2 S'rn Ghana Ghana ~20%? (1930s) 1880-1930 tension 1910-1920s none  reported (?) some? Y N Rathbone 
2 S'rn Ghana  Ghana ~20%? (1960s) 1940-1970 tension 196600.00% none reported thousands  Y Y Boone 
3 Casamance Senegal 15%? 1990s Y, rebellion 1990s 100s few Y Y( possible) UCD 
3 Rift Valley Prov. Kenya 40% 1960-2000 Y 1991-7, 2007 ~1000 500,000 Y Y Boone 
3 SW Cote d'Ivoire 
Côte 
d'Ivoire  40% 1960-2010 
Y, 
repression 1970 2,000-6,000   Y Y Dozon 
3 SW Côte d'Ivoire 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 50% 1995-2000 Y 1995-2000 100s 200,000 Y Y Chauveau 
3 E. Rwanda Rwanda 60% 1970-1994 Y 1990-1994 1,000s   Y Y Verwimp 
3 E. DRC DRC 40% 1970-1994 Y 1992-1994 1,000s thousands Y Y Laurent 
3 Plateau State/Jos Nigeria 50%? 1990s-2010s Y periodic 100s hundreds Y Y (state) Harnischfeger 
3 Kibaale District Uganda 50%? (2002) 1960-2010 Y 2002 tens tens Y Y (possible) Green 
3 Office du Niger Mali 80% 1960-2010 N NA none 
very few 
farmers Y NA Diawara 
3 N'rn Zimbabwe  Ziimbabwe 70%?  1980-2000s Y 2000-2005 100s thousands?  Y* Y (possible) Kriger 
3 Kiru Valley Tanzania 75% 1970-2010s Y 2000s 5 to 8 dozens?  N possible  Boone 
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Table 2:  Presence/ Absence, Scale, and Timing of SoS-type Land Conflict: Cases 
 
 
   Table 2 about here  
  
 
Type 1 case are cases of neocustomary LTRs with high competition around land and low rates of in-
migration in smallholder framing regions.  Some of the best known ethnographies and case studies of 
socio-political dynamics under rising land scarcity fall into this category (Table 2).  In these situations, 
families are likely become the units of land contestation, with land scarcity and land inheritance issues 
fueling microconflicts that pit youth against elders, wives against wives, wives against sisters or brothers or 
children. In pre-genocide Rwanda, for example, André and Platteau (1998) found that in the Ruhengeri 
zone, where land shortage was terribly acute, murders and witchcraft accusations within families often had 
land-related dimensions. 
 
Type 2 cases are neocustomary LTRs with high ethnic heterogeneity in smallholder framing regions.  Here 
we see in-migrations of ethnic outsiders to supply labor on the farms and plantations created African 
peasants in their homeland territories. Migrants gained access to the land via permissive contracts with 
state-recognized SoS, establishing complementary (subordinate) economic relations with the indigenous (as 
workers, tenants, sharecroppers).   
 Although the structural conditions hypothesized in the classic SoS literature to cause SoS conflict 
have become increasing present in many such zones, and although the everyday micro-violations that F&L 
(2011) take as conflict triggering mechanisms (thefts, insults, rapes) can be assumed to be present, large-
scale SoS conflict is absent. This analysis argues that a variable omitted in the F&L model, land tenure 
institutions, explains this theoretically-generated anomaly. Neocustomary land institutions, backed by 
states, empower ethnic insiders, allowing them to regulate the size of the migrant population through 
restrictions on in-migration and expulsions.   
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 Cases in Table 2 provide instantiation of this.  JP Platteau (2002: 8-9) also offers many cases in 
point in a UN-WIDER review of African land relations under demographic stress. Under the heading "The 
growing incidence of exclusionary practices," Platteau describes changes in SoS-migrant relationships in 
the middle and upper Senegal River Valley.  Ethnic strangers constituted up to 20% of the population in the 
1970s, living as tenants and/or renting seasonal access to pasture.  They have been gradually marginalized 
by the SoS: 
An immediate upshot of the growing scarcity of land is that stranger farmers are being increasing 
denied their rights of access to land, especially to plots of relatively high quality.  In the Senegal 
River Valley, for example, the local Haalpulaar (Toucouleur) communities have become 
concerned that land will not be available in sufficient amounts for their children and 
grandchildren.  As a result, they have started closing access to the good inunable lands located 
near the river for all strangers and immigrant farmers, confining them to poor-quality drylands, 
which are still plentiful.  Similar events have occurred in many places in sub-Saharan Africa..."  
(Platteau 2002, 7-8) 
 
Administrative authorities intervene to containerize conflicts and suppress overt violence, but do not 
sanction the land expulsions, or try to enforce broken contacts.  Indeed, it would not make sense for them to 
do so.  The prevailing land institutions, recognized and backed by the state itself, empower SoS to give and 
take permissive land-access rights to/from ethnic outsiders.  
 Similarly, in southwest Burkina Faso, local SoS who welcomed the in-migration of tenant farmers 
in an expansion phase of cotton production now find that the land frontier is closed, and that they are in 
need of land. They have forced out many of the most vulnerable of the migrants who settled thirty or forty 
years ago, including adults who were born in the "host" region.  Gray and Kevane (2001: 583) write that in 
[the village] of Sara, Bwa farmers have expelled Mossi migrant farmers from an entire village area.. us[ing] 
threats of violence... In the end, it was sorcery that convinced Mossi farmers to abandon their fields. ... In 
several neighboring villages, land conflicts resulted in [localized] violence and murder."  Lavigne-Delville 
and Toulmin (2002:108) report that such practices became common-place in Burkina's cotton-farming 
zone: "The process of withdrawing land from migrant farmers has become so widespread, it seems futile to 
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attempt to stop it." Local administrative authorities (préfets and sous-préfets) seek to avoid direct 
involvement in the disputes, pressing SoS to not withdraw land from migrants without warning and 
referring migrants' appeals back to the state-recognized neocustomary authorities.  
 Type 2 cases listed Table 2 provide systematic documentation of these dynamics. They show that 
in-migration was regulated by SoS local authorities, (2) cooperative economic relations were established at 
t-1, (3) pressure on the land led to migrants' expulsion at t-2, (4) the state backs this up, and (5) that this 
happened without large-scale communal violence.  All of the cases listed in Table 2 experienced at least 
one change in the state coalition in the study period. Yet as expected, national-level changes are not 
associated with overt, local-level challenges to prevailing land tenure hierarchies. Two partial exceptions 
(Ghana under Rawlings and Burkina under Sankara, respectively) help to prove the rule.
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 The case studies underscore the large extent to which the numbers reported in the "% migrant" 
column of Table 2 are endogenous to the land institutions themselves.  (Part V takes up the "demographic 
determinism" hypothesis.)   
 The prevalence of Type 2 situations helps to account for the puzzling rarity of large scale SoS 
conflict in sub-Saharan Africa, compared to the predictions of the F&L (2011) model.   
 
Type 3 cases are examples of what Amin called "migrations of settlement," or what JP Laurent (1999) 
called "official migrations" or state-sponsored colonization movements. They are state-organized 
movements of agrarian colonization to settle African peasantries in sparsely-populated zones with high 
agricultural potential.  In these cases, new populations of ethnic outsiders -- sometimes of heterogeneous 
cultural backgrounds -- are settled on lands to which they have no state-recognized ethnic entitlement or 
ancestral claim.  Indigenous populations are pushed out of the core areas designated for settlement or 
pressured to accept the in-migrants and give them land.
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 Table 2 lists Type 3 cases of high competition for land and high ethnic diversity under statist land 
tenure institutions. The government supports migrants and represses the SoS.  Migrants are dependent on 
rulers' commitment to enforce the institutions that give them land rights in the face of SoS opposition.  
Rising pressure on the land intensifies tension.  Weakening of the government's commitment to the statist 
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LTRs (and to the migrants) encourages the SoS to mobilize to seek regime change. The co-presence of 
these factors has sets the stage for classic, land-related SOS conflicts.   
 Some well-known cases illustrate these dynamics.  In Rwanda, for example, after the defeat of the 
Tutsi government in 1959, the state took direct control of former Tutsi-held land in eastern Rwanda in the 
1960s and 1970s and settled in-migrants on plots delimited by the government.  In-migrants came in 
disproportionate numbers from politically-favored areas of the country (Ruhengeri, for example). The same 
configuration is observed in the Rift Valley settlement schemes in Kenya, where the postcolonial 
government acquired land from departing white settlers in the 1960s and 1970s and re-allocated it to in-
migrants, disproportionately Kikuyu migrants from the president's home areas, in the face of opposition 
from aggrieved SoS.  
 The World Bank supported the bringing state land under cultivation by land-hungry peasants in 
both Rwanda and Kenya, just as in the Sri Lankan case taken as paradigmatic in F&L (2011).
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  In Rwanda 
in the 1970s, the World Bank funded paysannat scheme to settle 9,000 farming families on 51,000 ha. of 
savanna land in Mutara (Byumba prefecture). In the 1960s and 1970s, settlement schemes in the Rift 
Valley of Kenya settled tens of thousands of new farmers.  Transactable land titles were never obtained by 
most migrant farmers (settlers) in either case.   
 Statist land institutions have often been costly to impose and maintain. The government of 
Houphouet-Boigny killed thousands in the "Guébié genocide” of 1970s, putting down a Bété SoS rebellion 
against the government (and against state-imposed in-migration of farmers) in southern Côte d'Ivoire. 
Repression in central Kenya against SoS Nandi and "Kalenjin coalition" groups was consistent over the 
course of the  Kenyatta era (1963-1979).  Repression against the Rwandan Tutsi was a constant over the 
1960-1990 period.  
 Several other cases ethnic violence over land, albeit some on lesser scales (eg. the Casamance 
conflict took over 1000 lives over the decade of the 1990s), are listed in Table 2. SoS terminology has been 
invoked in scholarly literatures to describe many of these conflicts.
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 What about the timing of large-scale episodes of SoS-migrant violence?   Does this paper's 
hypothesis about the "trigger" mechanism find any support in these cases?  The most ferocious and 
destructive ethnic conflicts around land in Africa since 1990 have emerged in precisely where competition 
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for control of the central state destabilizes preexisting land tenure institutions that protect settlers, creating 
opportunities for aggrieved SoS, with the backing of contenders for state power at the national level, to try 
to reclaim their land.  In the Rift Valley of Kenya, for example, the eclipse of the Kenyatta regime in 1982 
brought to power Moi, who was very weakly committed, if at all, to the settlers and the statist land regime 
that underpinned their land rights.  Moi cultivated his own support base among the SoS, articulating and 
giving voice to their land grievances.  In the elections of the 1990s, state coalition members mobilized SoS 
electoral constituencies in the settlement-scheme areas of the Rift Valley, intimidated the settlers, and 
organized violent attacks on migrants, their homes, and other property, pushing thousands of migrants out 
of these districts before and after the 1992 and 1997 general elections.  New contenders for power, or a 
rival ruling coalition, promised to take back lands claimed by SoS in Rwanda in the 1990s, in Côte d'Ivoire 
elections in the 1990s and 2000s, DRC in regional elections in 1990-1994, and Casamance under 
multipartism in the 1990s, often fomenting and encouraging violence.  The Nigeria (Plateau State cases) 
generally conform, but here we have to look at the shifting dynamics of state-level government.  Political 
intimidation, killings, and expulsions of migrants were seen in all the Type 3 situations listed in Table 1.
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VI.  A rival argument: the demographic determinism hypothesis 
 
 This study has proposed an institutional explanation for the presence/absence of large-scale SoS 
conflict in zones in ethnic in-migration and rising land pressure.  A scholar who rejects the institutional 
explanation might ask: But what if the land tenure regime was the consequence of ethnic demographies and 
the balance of power among them? If ethnic demography were determinant, then the land tenure regime 
(LTR) would shift in favor of the in-migrants as they became more numerous, and favor the SoS when 
these are more numerous.   
 As indicated above, the geographic distribution of different LTRs in early-mid 20th century Africa 
did bear a relation to rapports de force on the ground -- ie. to the balance of power between colonial 
governments and African populations.  The demographic determinism hypothesis asks us to extend this 
reasoning to the postcolonial era, and to relations the among contemporary, state-recognized ethnic groups. 
The hypothesis suggests that an in-migrant group could implant itself on land found within the state-
recognized homeland of an established, state-recognized ethnic group, and that the indigenes would 
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gradually allow these outsiders to appropriate territory and set up land control institutions that dispossess 
the SoS and uphold the outsiders' control over the land.   
 Let us consider some hypothetical mechanisms by which this kind of demographic determinism 
could produce such a shift in the property regime.  
 a. One possible mechanism would be a land market, wherein decentralized local decisions taken 
by individual agents pursuing their uncoordinated self-interest leads to a "tragedy of the commons" in the 
form of loss of customary lands and the indigenous group's collective patrimony. Yet the existence of a 
land market presupposes the existence of an overarching third-party authority that has created such a 
market, and regulates and enforces land sales.  As argued above, this has not existed in the neocustomary 
LTR zones of modern Africa.  On the contrary, the state has worked against precisely this effect in zones of 
neocustomary land tenure. Peaceful and incremental transfer via markets presupposes the existence of 
precisely the kind of markets that the neocustomary land tenure regions are designed to prevent. 
 b. Another possible mechanism could be violent take-over the land by an alien ethnic group, such 
as might occurr in a state of nature, or a mass revolution.  As mentioned above, colonial conquest itself did 
effectuate such a change in land ownership (land tenure regime) in some parts of some colonies, when 
conquered lands were violently cleared of their original owners and granted to white settlers.  Yet the the 
modern state in Africa has worked to suppress precisely this kind of local warfare in relations among 
Africans. Violent land take-overs by "alien ethnic groups" that have occurred have happened by acts of the 
state itself, as in Zimbabwe in the 2000s and Rwanda in the 1960s. 
 c. Another mechanism could be assimilation that gradually erases the ethnic distinction between 
the two groups.  Yet as argued above, 20th century neocustomary land tenure institutions have worked to 
discourage this.  These institutions create a self-enforcing dynamic whereby ethnic insiders are incentivized 
to protect their property entitlements over others.  A considerable literature in economic anthropology 
shows that ethnic identities around land hardened, not softened, in the 20th century (Berry 1993).  
 This study suggests that in Africa since the beginning of the 20th century, the demographic-
determinism hypothesis mistakes effect for cause.
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   LTRs determine the rules of the game that structure 
in-migration. Thus, under neocustomary land institutions, if the proportion of outsiders remains below, say, 
the 30% threshold, then this can be considered an effect of the rule itself, rather than factor that diminishes 
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the explanatory power of the institutional explanation in favor of a demographic explanation (which would 
holds that SoS are in power simply because they are the majority).  
 LTRs, like all institutions, are endogenous to the wider political order in which they are 
embedded.  Like all political institutions, they reflect -- however imperfectly -- underlying societal rapports 
de force, and they mutate, transform, and decay over time.  Transformations in state coalitions, 
demographic shifts such as those featured the demographic determinism hypothesis, and other changes in 
society at large can be expected to contribute to changes in property institutions.  Demographic change can 
alter social balances of power, but the political and institutional effects of this will be produced through 
contestation on playing fields that are structured by institutions, and that are nested in national structures 
and power relations. 
 
Conclusion  
 
 SoS type conflicts over land that are reminiscent of those in South Asia have exploded in some 
parts of Africa with great ferocity.  Many insights of the classic SoS literature, and in particular of the work 
of Fearon and Laitin and its antecedents and spin-offs, contribute to understanding these outcomes.  Yet 
patterns of ethnic political competition around land in Africa have given rise to unsolved thorny issues in 
the classic SoS literature. Most puzzlingly, ethnic conflict over land in Africa rarely reaches civil war 
proportions. Causal mechanisms hypothesized in the classic literature -- ethnic heterogeneity driven by in-
migration, and local economic competition -- are far more common in Africa than the outbreak of violence 
itself.  Why is this so? 
 This paper argues that omitted variable bias enfeebles the SoS model of F&L and its antecedents.  
F&L (2011) model land competition between SoS and migrants as taking place at the margins of the state, 
far from the centers of power, in an institutionless void.  This model is unrealistic for Africa, and indeed, 
for Sri Lanka (Moore 1985) and for settled agrarian society almost anywhere in the modern world. The 
African countryside is not a anarchic "state of nature" in which primordial tribes compete for land.  In 
zones of settled agriculture from at least the 1930s to the present, we see the heavy hand of the state in 
structuring and reinforcing ethnicity, controls over land access, and ethnic hierarchies around land.   
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 The analysis here shows that variation across land tenure institutions in rural Africa types goes far 
in explaining the uneven geographical pattern of large scale SoS conflict.  State-backed neocustomary 
institutions enforce "SoS" control over the land, allowing state-recognized ethnic groups to control land 
access within state-recognized homelands.  These institutions have been quite stable in most parts of rural 
Africa for the last few generations.  Statist land institutions, by contrast, give the government itself land-
allocation powers. They are more polarizing and contested, rely more heavily on direct state coercion, and 
can be destabilized by a change in the state coalition. These institutional differences go far in predicting 
where, and the conditions under which, large-scale ethnic violence around land is likely to erupt in rural 
Africa. 
 The political intuition of the F&L (2011) model is that state authorities will usually support 
settlers against migrants because of a raison d'état interest in colonizing the agrarian frontier.  As we have 
seen, however, the opposite is the norm in Africa.  In most of Africa, rulers, eager to establish political 
order and fearing rebellion, have preferred to institutionalize and support autochthones' control over the 
land. Central rulers benefit from the forms of political control over rural constituencies that neocustomary 
land institutions help to reproduce, and thus have strong political incentives to enforce them.  The 
allocation of land authority to local elites works to tamp down and contain land conflict at the local level, 
thereby deflecting it from the center.  The ongoing reproduction of neocustomary land tenure institutions 
goes far in explaining why so much interethnic land-related conflict in Africa remains local, small-scale, 
and mostly non-violent, and thus gets lost in events data and civil war datasets.   
 Rulers have supported migrants in some situations, however.  Rulers have created statist land 
tenure institutions where they do not fear rural rebellion, or are willing to risk it (willing to pay the cost of 
repressing the SoS, and thus presumably confident that they will succeed), and when/where the payoffs of 
building and enforcing statist land regimes -- political and/or economic -- are expected to be high.  Yet 
rulers and their priorities can change, and costs and benefits can fluctuate over time.  Under statist land 
tenure institutions, problems of state commitment are particularly acute. The specter of withdrawal of the 
state's commitment to migrants destabilizes statist land tenure institutions.  This can incentivize SoS to 
mobilize in protest, and give them national-level allies. The prospect of electoral turnover may create 
incentives for violent ethnic cleansing of local jurisdictions as a prelude to taking-back of the land (and for 
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migrant countermobilizations). Devastating cases of classic SoS-type land violence in Africa have arisen 
under these conditions.    
 SoS conflict models that are derived from realist theories of international relations, such as the 
Fearon and Laitin (2011) model, are driven by shifts in demographic balances and ad hoc observations 
about resource struggles.  Incorporation of institutions into explanatory equations promises to produce a 
significant increase in explanatory power, not only in analyses of SoS conflicts sub-Saharan Africa but also 
in studies focused on South Asia. In both regions, state-backed land institutions and national-level political 
dynamics also play a very significant part in explaining patterns of ethnic conflict over land.  Large-scale 
ethnic conflicts over farmland rarely reflect the absence of state institutions, whether this be in established 
farming regions with historic or on-going flows of in-migrants (as in the situations examined in this paper), 
or in situations of sudden-onset, conflict-induced migration shocks associated with refugee flows.  Instead, 
large-scale SoS-type land conflicts they are likely to emerge in contexts structured by state institutions and 
to be linked to powershifts and struggles over institutional (re)design.    
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ENDNOTES 
                         
1
 Jackson 2006, Platteau 2009, Boas 2009, Boas and Dunn 2010: 8, Verweijen 2015, Côté and Mitchell 
2015. Son-of-the-Soil conflicts are defined as arising when “a regional group that considers itself 
indigenous clashes with a migrant group” (Straus 2012: 195), or as conflict over agricultural land taken by 
immigrants.   
2
 Jayne et al., 2010: 1386, Jayne et al, 2014. 
3
F&L 2011 report that nearly 1/3 of all "ethnic" civil wars were sparked by a sons of the soil dimension, in 
which a regional group that considers itself indigenous clashed with a migrant group. By their results, SoS 
civil wars are are lower proportion of civil wars in Africa than they are in all other regions. They allude to 
the possibility their coding protocol leads to an undercount of SoS-type conflicts in Africa (2011: 210, n. 3).  
4
 See Uexkull and Peterson 2013 and Uppsala Conflict Data more generally.  
5
 Omission of the land tenure variable in F&L's Sri Lankan case study is a weakness in their model -- the 
value on the land regime variable constitutes an unacknowledged scope condition of their model.  This 
point is developed below. 
6
 A "subnational case study" is a case study centered on a geographic or administrative unit that is a sub-
unit (ie. part of, or nested in) a country, such as "northern Côte d'Ivoire," or an administrative district or 
province within a country.   
7
 Bhavnani and Lacina (2015) argue that in India, where SoS are represented in a state government that is 
aligned with the national-level ruling coalition, the coercive capacity of the state is likely to be used to 
shore-up SoS dominance, and conflict is unlikely. Where the SoS are "out of power," government is more 
likely to back the in-migrants, increasing the likelihood that frustrated SoS will resort to violence. 
8
 Rural population share by country excludes island states and Eritrea. 62% is the "SSA average." Both 
from World Bank, World Development Indicators 2015. 
9
 Anderson and Masters 2009: 257. 
10
 Wenban-Smith, 2014:8. 
11
 Cour 1994:190, Jayne et al., 2014, n. 2 and p. 14.  
12
 Jayne et al., 2010: 1385. On Kenya, Anderson and Masters 2009: 257. 
13
 Nabila 1992:62, Ominde 1968: 122, Zachariah and Condé 1981: 63.  
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14
 de Bruijn, van Dijk, Foeken, eds., 2001: 19-20. 
15
 Kagera 1982: 197.  
16
 Zachariah and Conde, 1981: 64. 
17
 Zachariah and Conde, 1981: 108. 
18
 Gimui, 1982: 147.  
19
 Swindell, 1982: 97.   
20
 Rural-to-rural migration patterns are uneven and non-random across and within countries. Large-scale 
ethnic in-migration is most likely where states have sponsored the rapid expansion of export-oriented 
agriculture (Amin 1974). (See Part III.) High degrees of cultural homogeneity do prevail in many, probably 
most, districts. Many of the very homogeneous localities are "sending-areas," or areas of high rural-to-rural 
outmigration.  
21
 These cases appear below, in Part IV. We are not referring here to sudden-onset, forced migrations due to 
conflict. Rather, the analysis focuses on state-sponsored economic migration.   
22
 Uexkull and Petersson 2013.   
23
 80% of all sub-Saharan Africa landholdings are estimated to be of less than 5 acres.  The average is 
estimated to be 1.6 hectares (Wiggins 2009:4).  
24
 I thus embrace explicitly an institutionalist model, rejecting the rival idea that land relations in agrarian 
SSA are fluid and ever-changing, or the random products of one-off interpersonal (or intercommunal) 
bargaining or one-off state interventions. This instituitonalist approach is also distinct from most 
institutional pluralism theorizing on African land tenure systems, but not necessarily antithetical to it.  The  
argument here can be restated in "institutional pluralism terms" as follows: There are different types and 
degrees of institutional pluralism or hybridity; these types differ across space (and time); and the spatial 
patterns are non-random. This paper proceeds to a (partial) theory of what the differences are, how patterns 
vary across space and time, and why they do so.  Most institutional pluralism theorists dealing with SSA 
land systems would perhaps accept most of this but still resist the structuralist epistemology of my 
approach.  I employ this structuralism as a heuristic move, not an ontological one, so there is still room for 
much basic agreement. 
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25
 As the term "institution" implies, we am talking about repeated interactions and routines that persist in 
equilibrium over time (but are not immune to destabilization or collapse), not one-off interventions or 
actions.  See Knight 1992. 
26
 90% is a cross-country rough estimate. See also Alden Wily 2012; Byamugisha 2014. Boone 2014: 23 
shows that there is considerable varation across countries (and macro-regions) in SSA. 
27
 This is a figure commonly cited in the Kenyan press.  See for example Muchemi Wachira, "Community 
Land to be registered once Bill is passed," Daily Nation (Nairobi), 26 September 2016. On-line at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/news/Community-land-to-be-registered--once-Bill-is-passed/-/1056/2887298/-
/pfcbub/-/index.html, accessed 22 October 2016.  On analysis of several different Kenyan land politics 
situations, see Joireman 2011.  
28
 Not all adjudicated land in Kenya is titled, and not all titles on adjudicated land are valid and transactable. 
A refined typology of land tenure institutions would draw out some of these distinctions. See for example 
Shipton 2009 on western Kenya. 
29
 In Nigeria, state government was also sugggested as a response.   
30
 Some limitations are: (a.) units are provincial-level, and thus larger than the district-level units more 
appropriate here; (b.) Afrobarometer does not distinguish between urban and rural, generating considerable 
noise in the data, and (c.) the number of responses per subnational unit is low. For example, of 264 
respondants from Kenya's vast Rift Valley Province, 144 (54.5%) answered "the central government 
allocates the land," and only 23 (8.7%) answered "traditional leaders." Proportions reverse for Nyanza, 
conforming to expections: the Rift's farming districts (perhaps 35% of the total land area) are under a statist 
LTR, while farming areas in Nyanza are under a hybid form of tenure which subjects land tranactions to 
local political control and resticts transfers of land outside the extended family (Shipton 2009).   
31
 The term SoS here refers to ethnic groups recognized by the state as indigenous to particular state-
recognized ethnic territories.  
32
 See for example Dozon 1985, Boone and Duku (2012), Kuba, Lentz and Somda, eds. 2003, Grey and 
Kevane 2001, Jacob 2002. 
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33
 These are not the only factors that determine collective action capacity, as my use of the term "work to 
enhance" indicates. 
34
The downward accountability problems of chiefs are legion (see Rathbone 1993, Onoma 2010, Ribot 
1999), and community members with weak ties to communities may defect.  These are an important source 
of dynamism and change in land tenure systems, especially as land values rise.  See Oyerinde 2008. 
35
 See Prioul et Sirven 1981 (Planche XXIII), Boone 2014:239.   
36
See Table 2 for cites to sources. 
37
 For examples of actual settlement scheme maps, see Prioul et Sirven 1981, Schneider 2014, Silberfein 
1998, and maps of the Office du Niger scheme in Mali. These maps reveal the geometric logic and 
uniformization of parcel-demarcation, scheme lay-out, and top-down spatial planning that are the signature 
of state bureaucracy.  Figure 3's depiction of the spatial arrangement of different ethnicities is based on 
text-based depictions in the secondary literature (see sources cited in Table 2), as well as actual government 
and state-commissioned maps of settlement patterns in zones of statist land tenure (for example, Varlet 
2013, Institut de Recherche pour le Développement cartographic database for Côte d'Ivoire and Cameroon, 
the village mappings carried out in the framework of the Ivoirian government's Programme Nationale de 
Gestion des Terres Rurales in 2006, and the author's field observations in Rift Valley (Molo area) 
settlement schemes in Kenya in June 2016).  
38
 In Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, the Senegal River Valley, Tanganika, and even in Kenya after the 1930s, 
colonial rulers rejected plans for (further) land expropriations out of fear of their politically-destabilizing 
consequences. Postcolonial governments have also often backed down when land appropriation plans have 
met with threats of local rebellion.  Even in today's era of large-scale land acquisitions, it is rare for rulers 
to support outside investors against settled agriculturalists with neocustomary land claims in a state-
recognized "ethnic homeland" (Boone 2015).   
39
 F&L 2011 model the state as simply reacting to spontaneous outbreaks of violence between groups 
interacting in a "state of nature."    
40
 See also Boone 2011, Boone and Duku 2012, Boone 2014, and Boone and Nyeme 2015 for sources, 
including the author's primary research in some of the case-study areas. 
41
 Ibid and sources listed in Table 2. 
 54 
                                                                         
42
 Both Rawlings and Sankara experimented with not backing up SoS pressure to exclude in-migrants. 
However these episodes end when Rawlings reverses course and the Sankara regime is overthrown. See 
Boone 2014.   
43
 On the Jos/Platteau, see Boone 2014: 341-342. Where pastoralists are displaced to make way for settlers, 
there is not direct competition between two groups of settled agriculturalists.  However farmer-herder 
conflict is common and ever-increasingly so in many parts of Africa. Some of these are indeed traceable to 
earlier displacements of pastoralists by governments intent on settling agriculturalists on former grazing 
lands.  
44
 Moore (1985) explains that the Sri Lanka zone of SoS conflict featured in F&L 2011 was the site of 
"very political and highly politicized" (43) Dry Zone settlement schemes in which state land (Crown land) 
was allocated to outsiders within "a relatively elaborate and planned legal and institutional framework" (30).  
A very large proportion of the population was living on land ceded directly to them by the state "in a zone 
formerly occupied by mainly Tamil speakers" (46).   
45
 On Tanzania (Kiru Valley), see Boone and Nyeme 2015. This country has been governed by the same 
party since independence (as Tanganika) in 1961. 
46
 Ethiopia, which has seen large scale, state-sponsored "economic" migration into zones of statist land 
tenure over the last decades, remains an important test case: there has been no change in the national 
governing regime in Ethiopia since 1991. 
47
 It mistakes an institutional effect for a demographic one.  Thirty years ago, Katzenstein cautioned against 
a demographic explanation of the rise of nativist movements (1979: 61, 62) .  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
